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Chong: Back to the Drawing Board! Legislating Hollywood

BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD! LEGISLATING
HOLLYWOOD
A REGULATION THAT RESOLVES THE FILM INDUSTRY’S CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.

Christina Shu Jien Chong1
INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of Justice “contended that equal
employment opportunity in the broadcast industry could ‘contribute
significantly toward reducing . . . discrimination in other industries’
because of the ‘enormous impact . . . television . . . [has] upon
American
life.’”2
Courts
have
also
recognized
that
“communities . . . ’[must] take an active interest in the . . . quality of
[television programming because television] has a vast impact on
their lives and the lives of their children.’”3 Unfortunately,
Hollywood continues to promote an insular culture that excludes
minorities from influential behind-the-camera and on-screen
positions.4

1. Christina Shu Jien Chong received her B.A. and J.D. from Berkeley Law. She is currently a
Lecturer and the Associate Director of Academic Skills at UC Irvine, School of Law. Professor Chong
previously taught in the academic support department at Berkeley Law and was an Assistant Professor
at the University of San Francisco, where she managed its Academic and Bar Exam Success Program.
Professor Chong has five years of experience working as a substantive law expert and attorney advisor
for Themis Bar Review and is an active board member of the Conference of Asian Pacific American
Law Faculty and Technology Editor of The Learning Curve. Prior to entering academia, Professor
Chong was the Director of Public Programing for UC Berkeley’s Center for Latino Policy Research,
externed for Justice Goodwin Liu at the California Supreme Court, and worked for Merlin
Entertainments, an international hospitality company, as an Operations and Events Manager. She was
also the Managing Editor of Berkeley Law’s Journal of Entertainment and Sports Law.
2. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 555 (1990) (citing Nondiscrimination Emp’t Practices
of Broad. Licensees, 23 F.C.C.2d 430, 771 (1970)), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
3. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
4. Christina Shu Jien Chong, Where Are the Asians in Hollywood? Can § 1981, Title VII,
Colorblind Pitches, and Understanding Biases Break the Bamboo Ceiling?, 21 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM.
L. J. 29, 49–50 (2016).
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Although the government established agencies, such as the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), to ensure that networks and
stations operate in the public’s interest, my research revealed that
minorities are still vastly underrepresented in the film industry.5 My
research study confirmed that minority representation remained
nearly stagnant between 2010 and 2014 and that the white majority
continued to dominate as directors, casting directors, screenwriters,
actors, and actresses.6 These results suggest that America’s existing
regulatory schemes are unable to break the cycle of bias among film
creators and that the lack of diverse perspectives in Hollywood
minimizes the number of casting calls seeking non-white talent and
perpetuates the inaccurate, stereotypical portrayal of minorities.7 As a
result, society’s members develop negative implicit biases about
minorities that strengthen the bamboo ceiling in the film industry and
prevented people of color from succeeding as professional artists.8
The
courts
believe
that
“communities
throughout
the . . . country . . . must bear [the] final responsibility for the quality
and adequacy of television service” and that members of the “public
[should not] feel . . . [that] they are unduly interfering in the private
business affairs of others” because the public has a direct interest in
television programming.9 However, recent decisions, such as
Claybrooks v. ABC and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, suggest
that courts sometimes fail to recognize the public’s desire to promote
antidiscrimination in employment and diversity, especially when
these interests conflict with an individual’s freedom of expression.10
This article urges the public to hold Congress and the judiciary
responsible for ensuring children are exposed to a diverse portrayal
of minority experiences on screen and providing minorities with the
equal opportunity to earn a reasonable living in entertainment—
5. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003. See generally Chong, supra
note 3.
6. Chong, supra note 3, at 31–33, 70.
7. Id. at 38.
8. Id. at 69.
9. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003.
10. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Co., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 999–1000 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
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America’s most influential industry. Our judges need more direction
from Congress to establish a precedent that properly balances our
country’s First Amendment and antidiscrimination values because,
currently, the courts are failing to stop discrimination in Hollywood
despite Congress’s passage of Title VII and § 1981.11 Entertainment
leaders also need congressional guidance because the industry has
not eliminated its improper practices through self-regulation.12 Thus,
this article presents a legislative solution that can reduce the film
industry’s prejudicial actions without interfering with artists’ right to
express their views.
Part I reviews the regulatory history of the broadcast, cable, and
film industries.13 This section also uses statistics to explain why
legislative action is necessary to promote nonstereotypical
appearances of minorities in films and employment of minorities in
front of and behind the camera.14 Part II examines the
constitutionality of a content-based regulation that requires casting
calls to be race neutral.15 This section argues that casting calls with a
preference for actors or actresses of a particular race constitute
unlawful speech under Title VII, and similar to obscene and
commercial speech, these discriminatory employment advertisements
deserve minimal or no protection under the First Amendment.16
Thus, even if no legislation is passed, Hollywood’s current hiring
practices are illegal. Part III argues that even if the Supreme Court of
the United States applies strict scrutiny, the regulation is
constitutional because eliminating discriminatory casting calls serves
the compelling government interests of (1) protecting a minority’s
right to earn a living in Hollywood and (2) shielding America’s
children from developing implicit biases after constant exposure to
the discriminatory portrayals of minorities on screen.17

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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Chong, supra note 3, at 53, 56.
Id. at 66–67.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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I. The Broadcast, Cable, and Film Industries
Although free speech absolutists claim that regulating the
entertainment industry violates the First Amendment, past regulatory
actions by the legislative and judicial branches suggest otherwise.18
This section provides a brief overview and history of the regulations
in the broadcast and cable industries that are relevant to this article
and explains why legislative action is necessary.
A. An Overview of the Broadcast and Cable Industries
Broadcast television (TV), also known as over-the-air broadcasting
or terrestrial TV, began in 1927 and is an industry where networks
deliver programs to the public for free.19 The networks transmit TV
signals by radio waves to a receiver, such as an antenna.20 Because
the radio frequency spectrum is limited, most governments require a
station license to prevent networks from broadcasting over each
other’s airwaves.21 Broadcast TV was the only method of TV
delivery until cable TV was popularized in the 1950s.22 The major
networks in the United States are ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC.23
Unlike broadcast TV, cable TV is a system where programs are
delivered through coaxial cables to individual receivers of paying
subscribers.24 Cable operators, such as AT&T and Comcast, deliver
programming from four sources: (1) retransmission of broadcast
18. Chong, supra note 3, at 56.
19. David
E.
Fisher
et
al.,
Television,
ENCYC.
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/technology/television-technology [perma.cc/8J28-SJJ2] (last visited Nov. 1,
2018).
20. Id.; What Is the Difference Between Broadcast and Cable Television?, I AGREE TO SEE,
http://www.iagreetosee.com/faq/what-is-the-difference-between-broadcast-and-cable-television/
[https://perma.cc/GM8R-FB9R] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
21. STEVEN WALDMAN, THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES 276 (2011),
https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/the-information-needs-of-communities-report-july-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PNK-7USW].
22. Lydia
Boyd,
Brief
History
of
the
Television
History,
AD*ACCESS,
https://library.duke.edu/specialcollections/scriptorium/adaccess/tv-history.html [https://perma.cc/JM9JZR3X] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
23. TV Broadcast & Cable Networks Industry Insights From D&B Hoovers, D&B HOOVERS,
http://www.hoovers.com/industry-facts.tv-broadcast-cable-networks.1470.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2017).
24. What Is the Difference Between Broadcast and Cable Television?, supra note 19.
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stations; (2) programs purchased from cable networks, such as ESPN,
Fox News, USA, TBS, and Disney; (3) programs created by the cable
operator itself; and (4) programs on third-party and governmentowned access channels.25 The program sources for each network vary
but are usually produced by independent companies, such as Viacom,
CBS, NBCUniversal, Time Warner, Twenty-First Century Fox,
Disney, and British Broadcasting Corporation Worldwide.26
B. Regulation of the Broadcast Industry
Early regulation of the entertainment industry suggests that
Congress did not view the freedom of speech as an unlimited right.27
Instead, Congress feared that without governmental control “the
public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in
the broadcasting field.”28 Similarly, the Supreme Court believes that
the medium of broadcast has the “special characteristic” of scarcity,
which “calls for more exacting regulation.”29 In recent years, overthe-air broadcasting has transitioned to delivering TV signals via
cable or satellite, but the government still regulates the broadcast
industry to ensure efficiency and diversity.30 This section discusses
the powers of the FCC and how its history suggests that the
entertainment industry is subject to regulation.
1. The Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934
To prevent chaos over radio frequencies, the Radio Act of 1927
created a unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the
broadcast industry and the Federal Radio Commission (FRC).31 The
Radio Act of 1927 gave the FRC the power to deny licenses to
25. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 787–88 (1996).
26. Who Owns What on Television?, NEATORAMA (July 7, 2008, 3:13 AM),
https://www.neatorama.com/2008/07/07/who-owns-what-on-television/ [https://perma.cc/G2KZ-28NE].
27. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943).
28. Id. at 219.
29. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 375 (1984).
30. Bethany M. Burns, Reforming the Newspaper Industry: Achieving First Amendment Goals of
Diversity Through Structural Regulation, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 61, 62–63 (1997).
31. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 212–13.
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stations that made exclusivity agreements with networks, which is an
example of Congress approving indirect regulation of private
dealings.32
TV became available in the late 1920s,33 but Congress did not
replace the FRC with the FCC until the Communications Act of
1934.34 The Communications Act authorizes the FCC to regulate the
radio and TV industries and requires the FCC to grant broadcasting
licenses that are in the “public convenience, interest, or necessity.”35
Although the FCC cannot edit broadcasts that it deems
inappropriate, it can review the content of past and future broadcasts
through the license-renewal36 and license-granting processes.37 When
granting initial licenses, the FCC can forecast the station’s
performance, but when analyzing renewals, the FCC must focus on
the broadcaster’s past actions.38 If a broadcaster failed to promote
operations and programs that furthered the public interest of its
listeners then the FCC can deny the broadcaster’s renewal
application.39
Currently, the FCC’s licensing power is broad and applies to both
noncommercial and commercial broadcasters40; its powers are not
limited to the engineering and technical aspects of regulating
frequencies, hours, and licensees.41 For example, the FCC does not
have unfettered censorship power over broadcast communications,42
but it can regulate the broadcast of obscene, indecent, or profane
language.43 Congress’s decision to provide vast powers to the FCC
32. Id. at 200–01.
33. Fisher, supra note 18.
34. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 217.
35. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2018); Federal Communications Commission, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Communications_Commission
[https://perma.cc/SE7A-DZ54]
(last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
36. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 737 (1978).
37. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. Id.
39. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 216; Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at
1003, 1007.
40. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 367 (1984).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2018); Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 215.
42. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2018).
43. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 737 (1978).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/2

6

Chong: Back to the Drawing Board! Legislating Hollywood

2019]

LEGISLATING HOLLYWOOD

611

suggests an effort to regulate an industry that was dominated by the
majority and excluded minority viewpoints.
2. The FCC’s Employment and Diversity Goals
In addition to using its licensing powers to further the public’s
interest, the FCC promotes three basic concepts in its regulatory
decisions to encourage diversity: (1) nondiscrimination in
employment, (2) affirmative action, and (3) proper discovery of
community problems.44 Despite the FCC’s explicit efforts to
encourage diversity, Hollywood still remains dominated by the
majority,45 which further supports the idea that legislative attention is
necessary. This section discusses the three FCC diversity goals and
explains how the FCC’s efforts, although valiant, have not been
enough to change Hollywood.
a) Nondiscrimination in Employment
“[F]rom the outset, . . . the [FCC] has recognized that the public
interest is not served by licensees who engage in intentional
employment discrimination.”46 The FCC requires that no person be
denied employment or related benefits on the grounds of his or her
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.47
The FCC also analyzes employment practices of licensees “to the
extent those practices affect the obligation of the licensee to provide
programing that ‘fairly reflects the tastes and the viewpoints of
minority groups.’”48 A licensee’s disproportionate employment of
minorities, “standing alone, does not necessarily present an issue
warranting exploration in an evidentiary hearing.”49 But, a “highly
44. La. Television Broad. Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 561, 562–63 (1975).
45. Chong, supra note 4, at 28.
46. Bilingual Bicultural Coal. on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
47. La. Television Broad. Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d at 563. The FCC examines the broadcaster’s past
employment practices to determine if there is (1) a pattern of intentional discrimination that would
seriously put into question the licensee’s character qualifications to remain a licensee and (2) intentional
discrimination, which would almost invariably disqualify a broadcast from a position of public
trusteeship. Bilingual Bicultural Coal., 595 F.2d at 629.
48. Bilingual Bicultural Coal., 595 F.2d at 628.
49. La. Television Broad. Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d at 563.
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disproportionate representation of minorities and women employed
by a licensee in relation to their presence in the population or
workforce may constitute evidence of discriminatory practices.”50 At
first glance, the FCC’s current scheme appears to protect minorities
and promote equal opportunity in employment, but my study of
Hollywood, which is discussed in Section D, indicates that unfair
hiring procedures still exist in the industry.51
b) Affirmative Action
The FCC “requires licensees to make additional efforts to recruit,
employ[,] and promote qualified members of minority and women
groups.”52 If a licensee’s “employment profile falls below a zone of
reasonableness, the licensee must modify or supplement its
recruitment practices and policies by vigorous and systematic efforts
to locate and encourage the candidacy of qualified minorities and
women.”53 For example, the licensee must eliminate recruitment
activities that perpetuate hiring schemes that rely upon personal
contacts and friendships, a hiring practice that often benefits
nonminority males and often excludes minorities and women.54
Many companies have diversity initiatives to promote inclusivity, but
these diversity hiring programs have become more of a marketing
scheme than a legitimate pipeline program to leadership positions in
Hollywood,55 which means there is minimal movement of minorities
into top positions in the film industry.
c) Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by
Broadcast Applicants
A broadcast licensee’s response to the conflicting needs of the
groups in its service area remains largely within its discretion, but it
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
See infra Part I.D.
La. Television Broad. Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d at 563.
Id.
Id.
Chong, supra note 3, at 66.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/2

8

Chong: Back to the Drawing Board! Legislating Hollywood

2019]

LEGISLATING HOLLYWOOD

613

cannot “flatly ignore a strongly expressed need.”56 Although there is
no requirement that the station devote 20% of its airtime to needs
expressed by 20% of its viewing public, the licensee must act
reasonably.57 If a licensee is unable to adequately serve the needs of
both the majority and minorities in its service area, then its renewal
application will be denied unless the licensee can prove it made
“reasonable efforts” to broadcast programs of particular interest to
minorities.58
The FCC’s Ascertainment Policy recognizes that “[g]roups with
the greatest problems may be the least organized and have [the]
fewest recognized spokesmen.”59 Thus, additional efforts are
necessary to identify their leaders and establish a dialogue to
ascertain their problems and interests.60 Broadcasters can satisfy this
requirement by conducting a random sample of the general public or
meeting with community leaders, but questionnaires and preprinted
forms cannot be used in lieu of personal connections.61
The FCC has never held that the needs of a minority group may
only be satisfied by programs designed specifically for that group.62
A wider range of appeal can suffice to satisfy the licensee’s
obligation of service to demographic minorities, but the broadcast
industry cannot accept that appeal to general tastes, intellects,
problems, needs, and interests is the only way programing decisions
should be made.63 The FCC encourages broadcasters to consider the
needs of minorities64 by expressly including “minority and ethnic
groups” as segments of the community that licensees are expected to
consult.65 However, despite this explicit, regulated, and recognized
56. Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
57. Id. For example, “[a] station should be ready, able, and willing to serve the needs of the local
community by broadcasting such outstanding local events as community concerts, civic meetings, [and]
local sports events . . . .” Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 203 (1943).
58. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 50 F.C.C.2d 461, 473 (1974).
59. WGN of Colo., Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 413, 420 (1971).
60. Id.
61. Stone, 466 F.2d at 326.
62. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 50 F.C.C.2d at 473.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 587 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 50 F.C.C.2d at 473.
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ascertainment program run by the FCC, decision-making positions
still lack minority representation, minorities are often placed in
menial jobs, and stations have low minority employment statistics.66
To increase the number of minorities on screen, Hollywood needs
more representation behind-the-scenes. The FCC is trying to make
the industry diverse through its three explicit policies, but it has been
unsuccessful,67 which is why this article argues for more concrete
regulation of the entertainment industry.
C. Regulation of the Cable and Film Industries
Some people might argue that allowing regulation of the broadcast
industry does not mean that the cable and film industries can also be
regulated, but this argument fails because local governments
currently regulate cable operators’ rights and obligations through
franchise authorities that control access to public rights-of-way and
easements related to the laying of cable lines.68 Local franchising
agreements were the first form of cable regulation and began in the
1960s,69 and today, the federal government still requires these
franchise agreements.70 In 1972, Congress explicitly required cable
operators to reserve 10%–15% of their channels for commercial lease
to unaffiliated third parties.71 The leased access channels created
another avenue for programmers, who would otherwise be excluded
from cable, to express their views.72 Congress also required operators
to set aside channels for public, educational, and government
programming (PEG channels).73 Local governments often hired an
access channel manager—usually a nonprofit organization—that
prescreened programming, promulgated rules for use of the PEG
channels, and dealt with any issues arising from programming; this
locally accountable body, not the cable operators, had editorial
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

WGN of Colo., Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 413, 415 (1971).
Chong, supra note 3, at 30.
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 788 (1996).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 760.
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control.74 On leased and PEG channels, federal law prohibited the
cable operator from exercising any control over program content
until 1992, when Congress allowed operators to prohibit the
broadcasting of indecent programs.75 These are all examples of
Congress allowing regulation of the cable industry to promote
diversity. Unfortunately, this minimal regulation has not been enough
to garner any significant change.
As for the film industry, its leaders must still abide by general tort,
contract, intellectual property, and employment regulations, such as
Title VII and copyright laws.76 Similar to the broadcast industry,
Congress has suggested that cable and film companies do not have
unfettered discretion to operate their businesses and must consider
diversity and excluded groups in their programming.77 The question
is whether current regulation is enough. This article argues, “No.”
D. Studies that Prove a Lack of Diversity in the Film Industry
Still Exists
Congress has regulated entertainment via the broadcast and cable
industry for almost 100 years,78 but more regulation is necessary
because our TV and movie casts still lack diversity. The disparity in
representation suggests that current regulation of the cable, broadcast,
and film industries is not enough because representation has not
reached parity. This section provides two examples of
underrepresentation of minorities despite the existence of current
regulations: (1) ownership of broadcast stations and (2)
representation in movies and broadcast television behind the camera
and on screen.
74. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms., 518 U.S. at 761.
75. Id. at 760.
76. Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 474 (11th Cir. 1999); Paige Zandri, Lights,
Camera . . . Litigation?:
Film
Industry
Law,
PRIORI
LEGAL
(June
13,
2014),
https://www.priorilegal.com/blog/film-industry-law [https://perma.cc/KZ7M-NRZ3].
77. Congress Members Weigh in on Diversity in Hollywood, MULTICULTURAL MEDIA CAUCUS
(June 7, 2017), https://multiculturalmediacaucus-clarke.house.gov/congress-members-weigh-in-ondiversity-in-hollywood/ [https://perma.cc/2RVY-A2EA].
78. Anne P. Jones & Harry W. Quillan, Broadcasting Regulation: A Very Brief History, 37 FED.
COMM. L.J. 107, 107 (1985).
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1. Ownership of Broadcast Stations
In 1968, Congress recognized that “the most valuable broadcast
licenses were assigned many years ago” and determined that the
comparative hearings at the renewal stages were “an important
opportunity for excluded groups . . . to gain entry into the industry.”79
However, despite Congress’s push for diversity and its creation of the
FRC in 1927 and the FCC in 1934, by 1971—almost forty years
later—minorities still only owned ten of the approximately 7,500
radio stations in the country and none of the 1,000+ television
stations.80 In an effort to increase minority representation, the FCC
promulgated equal-employment-opportunity regulations through
“formal ‘ascertainment’ rules.”81
In 1978, eight years after the FCC enacted its ascertainment policy,
the views of racial minorities continued to be inadequately
represented in the broadcast media.82 Minorities still owned less than
1% of the nation’s radio and television stations.83 The FCC
determined that additional measures were needed to include more
minority voices.84 In May 1978, the FCC adopted the Statement of
Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities
(Statement).85 The FCC historically maintained a race-neutral policy
when assigning licenses because minority ownership did not
necessarily mean that the owner would broadcast minority
programs,86 but Congress acknowledged that the FCC’s race-neutral
alternatives had failed to achieve necessary programming and
approved the Statement.87 Prior to passing the Statement, Congress
79. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 573 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
80. Id. at 553.
81. Id. at 586. The regulations required broadcasters “‘to ascertain the problems, needs[,] and
interests of the residents of his community of license . . . and to specify ‘what broadcast matter he
proposes to meet those problems, needs and interests.’” Id. (quoting Primer on Ascertainment of Cmty.
Problems by Broad. Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 682 (1971)).
82. Id. at 588.
83. Id. at 553.
84. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 588.
85. Id. at 556.
86. Id. at 555.
87. Id. at 589–90.
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conducted a study that revealed that “the effects of past inequities
stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a
severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass
communications.”88 Congress justified the minority ownership
policies of the FCC not as “remedies for victims of this
discrimination” but “primarily to promote programming diversity”
and urged that “diversity is an important governmental objective that
can serve as a constitutional basis for the [FCC’s] preference
policies.”89 The Supreme Court agreed.90 Representative Van Deerlin
explained that “the most effective way to reach the inadequacies of
the broadcast industry in employment and programming would be by
doing something at the top, that is, increasing minority ownership
and management and control in broadcast stations.”91
The Statement (1) pledged to consider minority ownership in the
proceedings for new licenses as a plus and (2) created a distress-sale
policy that allowed licensees under review by the FCC to assign their
licenses to an FCC-approved minority enterprise.92 Under the
distress-sale policy, the assignee must be comprised of at least 50%
minority ownership, the sale price for the licensee must not exceed
more than 75% of the fair-market value, and the assignee must
purchase the licensee before the hearing.93 This “congressional
[support] showed [a] clear recognition of the extreme
underrepresentation of minorities and their perspectives in the
broadcast mass media.”94
In addition to the Statement, in 1981, Congress authorized a lottery
procedure that randomly selected an application from a pool of
qualified applicants in the selection process for an initial license and
construction permit.95 The procedure gave “significant” preferences
in the lottery process to groups that were underrepresented in the
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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ownership of telecommunications facilities and whose selection
would increase the diversification of mass media ownership and
programming offered to the public.96 Unfortunately, in 1986,
minorities owned only 2.1% of the more than 11,000 radio and
television stations in the United States—a mere 1% increase since
1978.97 Congress explicitly endorsed the FCC’s diversity policies,
but progress was still slow.98 Moreover, the 2.1% statistic failed to
reflect that, as late entrants to the industry, minorities often obtained
less valuable stations and only served geographically limited markets
with relatively small audiences.99
By 1990, the Court recognized that for the past two decades,
minorities constituted at least one-fifth of the United States
population, but very few members of the minority groups held
broadcasting licenses.100 It is now 2018—almost sixty years after our
nation began its efforts to produce sufficient diversity in
programming.101 Representation has improved but not significantly
enough.102 This article argues that our country has focused its efforts
on increasing ownership statistics of the distributors without realizing
that the majority also dominates the leadership positions responsible
for creating a film’s content. As a result, the films available to
broadcast owners are mostly created by writers, directors, and
producers with a majority perspective using mainly white actors and
actresses, which leads to a small selection of diverse films for
broadcast stations and cable networks.
2. Underrepresentation Behind the Camera and On Screen
In 2014, my research study recorded the race of 2,394 actors and
actresses cast in 500 popular films over a span of five years (2010 to
2014).103 The annual sample of films included the top twenty-five
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 575–76.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 553–54.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 585.
Chong, supra note 3, at 44.
Id. at 32.
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movies grossing over $40 million during opening weekend, the top
twenty-five movies grossing under $40 million during opening
weekend, the top twenty-five television shows with over 2 million
viewers, and the top twenty-five television shows with under 2
million viewers.104 The rankings for the movies and television shows
were collected from boxofficemojo.com,105 deadline.com,106 and
tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com.107
104. Id.
105. 2010
Domestic
Grosses,
BOX
OFFICE
MOJO,
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?view=releasedate&view2=domestic&yr=2010&sort=open
gross&order=DESC&p=.htm [https://perma.cc/XM6H-M25N] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); 2011
Domestic
Grosses,
BOX
OFFICE
MOJO,
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?
view=releasedate&view2=domestic&yr=2011&sort=opengross&order=DESC&p=.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q6KC-ZYPF] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); 2012 Domestic Grosses, BOX OFFICE
MOJO,
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?view=releasedate&view2=domestic&yr=2012
&sort=opengross&order=DESC&p=.htm [https://perma.cc/CY6S-B4LX] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016);
2013 Domestic Grosses, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?
view=releasedate&view2=domestic&yr=2013&sort=opengross&order=DESC&p=.htm
[https://perma.cc/WL5Y-G3YC] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); 2014 Domestic Grosses, BOX OFFICE
MOJO,
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?view=releasedate&view2=domestic&yr=2014&
sort=opengross&order=DESC&p=.htm [https://perma.cc/59VF-A4CN] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
106. Nellie Andreeva, Full Series Rankings for the 2009–10 Broadcast Season, DEADLINE (May 27,
2010, 11:49 PM), http://deadline.com/2010/05/full-series-rankings-for-the-2009-10-broadcast-season44277/ [https://perma.cc/9SUJ-X62Y]; Nellie Andreeva, Full 2010–2011 TV Season Series Rankings,
DEADLINE (May 27, 2011, 10:56 AM), http://deadline.com/2011/05/full-2010-11-season-series-rankers135917/ [https://perma.cc/ E26N-BQE8]; Nellie Andreeva, Full 2011–2012 TV Season Series Rankings,
DEADLINE (May 24, 2012, 11:10 PM), http://deadline.com/2012/05/full-2011-2012-tv-season-seriesrankings-277941/ [https://perma.cc/VV8S-AL3S]; Full 2013–2014 TV Season Series Rankings,
DEADLINE (May 22, 2014, 4:40 PM), https://deadline.com/2014/05/tv-season-series-rankings-2013-fulllist-2-733762/ [https://perma.cc/JYX3-MSUS].
107. 2010–11 Season Broadcast Primetime Show Viewership Averages, TV BY NUMBERS (June 1,
2011),
http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2011/06/01/2010-11-season-broadcast-primetime-showviewership-averages/94407 [https://perma.cc/6WH-22PU]; Complete List of 2011–12 Season TV Show
Ratings: ‘Sunday Night Football’ Tops, Followed by ‘American Idol,’ ‘The Voice’ & ‘Modern Family,’
TV BY NUMBERS (May 24, 2012), http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2012/05/24/final-list-of-2011-12season-tv-show-ratings-sunday-night-football-tops-followed-by-american-idol-the-voice-modernfamily/135747/ [https://perma.cc/377A-M5KL]; Complete List of 2012–13 Season TV Show
Viewership: ‘Sunday Night Football’ Tops, Followed by ‘NCIS,’ ‘The Big Bang Theory & ‘NCIS: Los
Angeles,’ TV BY NUMBERS (May 29, 2013), http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2013/05/29/completelist-of-2012-13-season-tv-show-viewership-sunday-night-football-tops-followed-by-ncis-the-big-bangtheory-ncis-los-angeles/184781/ [https://perma.cc/VT24-LDHC].
The research study used the following parameters. Lead roles in movies included actors
and actresses whose pictures appeared on the published movie poster. Supporting roles in
movies included actors and actresses who were listed in the Wikipedia starring section, but
did not appear on the movie poster. Lead roles in broadcast television included actors and
actresses who appeared in 90% of the episodes over the lifetime of the series. Supporting
roles included actors or actresses who appeared in 75–90% of the episodes over the
lifetime of the series. The race data for lead and supporting roles for movies and television
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The overall results revealed that whites occupied 83.5% of lead
roles while minorities occupied 16.5%—9.5% black, 2% Latino,
2.5% Asian, 0.5% Native American, and 2% Mixed/Other.108 For
supporting roles, whites were 85% and minorities were 15%—7%
black, 2.5% Latino, 3.5% Asian, 0% Native American, and 2%
Mixed/Other.109 In both categories, the minority representation was
extremely low compared to the U.S. population.110
OVERALL RESULTS
On-Screen Representation
Movies and
TV

U.S.
Population
in 2014

Lead
Roles

Difference
(Lead
Roles)

Supporting
Roles

Difference
(Supporting
Roles)

White

77.36%

83.5%

+6.14

85%

+7.64

Black

13.22%

9.5%

-3.72

7%

-6.22

Latino

17.37%

2%

-15.37

2.5%

-14.87

Asian

5.62%

2.5%

-3.12

3.5%

-2.12

Native
American

1.24%

0.5%

-0.74

0%

-1.24

Mixed/Other

N/A

2%

N/A

2%

N/A

Unknown

N/A

0%

N/A

0%

N/A

Total
Minorities

23%

16.5%

-6.5

15%

-8.00

In the movies category for on-screen roles, whites occupied 84%
of lead roles while minorities occupied 16%— 9% black, 2% Latino,
2% Asian, 0% Native American, and 3% Mixed/Other.111 For
supporting roles, whites were 83% and minorities were 17%— 8%
shows were collected through various online resources, such as IMDb, Wikipedia, movie
and TV webpages, news articles, and the network’s webpages.
Chong, supra note 3, at 32–33.
108. Chong, supra note 3, at 33.
109. Id.
110. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United
States, States, and Counties: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIV.,
(June
2015),
https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/PEP/2014/PEPSR6H
[https://perma.cc/8GBC-YZHT] [hereinafter Annual Estimates of the Resident Population].
111. Chong, supra note 3, at 33.
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black, 3% Latino, 3% Asian, 0% Native American, and 3%
Mixed/Other.112
MOVIES RESULTS
On-Screen Representation

Movies

U.S.
Population
in 2014

Lead
Roles

Difference
(Lead
Roles)

Supporting Roles

Difference
(Supporting
Roles)

White

77.36%

84%

+6.64

83%

+5.64

Black

13.22%

9%

-4.22

8%

-5.22

Latino

17.37%

2%

-15.37

3%

-14.37

Asian

5.62%

2%

-3.62

3%

-2.62

Native
American

1.24%

0%

-1.24

0%

-1.24

Mixed/
Other

N/A

3%

N/A

3%

N/A

Unknown

N/A

0%

N/A

0%

N/A

Total
Minorities

23%

16%

-7.00

17%

-6.00

In the television category, minorities fared slightly better. Whites
occupied 81% of lead roles while minorities occupied 19%—10%
black, 2% Latino, 3% Asian, 1% Native American, and 3%
Mixed/Other.113 For supporting roles, whites were 83% and
minorities were 17%—6% black, 2% Latino, 4% Asian, 0% Native
American, and 5% Mixed/Other.114

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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TV SHOWS RESULTS
On-Screen Representation
TV Shows

U.S.
Population
in 2014

Lead
Roles

Difference
(Lead
Roles)

Supporting
Roles

Difference
(Supporting Roles)

White

77.36%

81%

+3.64

83%

+5.64

Black

13.22%

10%

-3.22

6%

-7.22

Latino

17.37%

2%

-15.37

2%

-15.37

Asian

5.62%

3%

-2.62

4%

-1.62

Native
American

1.24%

1%

-0.24

0%

-1.24

Mixed/
Other

N/A

3%

N/A

5%

N/A

Unknown

N/A

0%

N/A

0%

N/A

Total
Minorities

23%

19%

-4.00

17%

-6.00

My research study also recorded the race of 417 directors, 580
casting directors, and 691 screenwriters from 2010 to 2014 using the
same 500 films mentioned above.115 The results revealed 94.5% of
directors were white and 15.5% were minorities—2.5% black, 1.5%
Latino, 1% Asian, and 0% Native American.116 For casting directors,
the results revealed 92.5% were white, 5.5% were Unknown, and 2%
were minorities— 1% black, 0.5% Latino, 0.5% Asian, and 0%
Native American.117 For screenwriters, 95% were white and 5% were
minorities—1.5% black, 2.5% Latino, 1% Asian, 0% Native
American, and 0.5% Mixed/Other.118 Similar to on-screen roles, the
minority representation was extremely low compared to the U.S.
population.119

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 34.
Chong, supra note 3, at 34.
Id.
Annual Estimates of the Resident Population, supra note 109.
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OVERALL RESULTS
Behind-the-Camera Representation
Movies and
TV

U.S.
Population in
2014

Directors

Casting
Directors

Screenwriters

White

94.5%
(+17.14)

92.5%
(+15.14)

95%
(+17.64)

77.36%

Black

2.5%
(-10.72)

1%
(-12.22)

1.5%
(-11.72)

13.22%

Latino

1.5%
(-15.87)

0.5%
(-16.87)

2.5%
(-14.87)

17.37%

Asian

1%
(-4.62)

0.5%
(-5.12)

1%
(-4.62)

5.62%

Native
American

0%
(-1.24)

0%
(-1.24)

0%
(-1.24)

1.24%

Mixed/Other

0%
(N/A)

0%
(N/A)

0%
(N/A)

N/A

Unknown

0%
(N/A)

5.5%
(N/A)

0%
(N/A)

N/A

Total
Minorities

5%
(-18.00)

2%
(-21.00)

5%
(-18.00)

23%

In the movies category for behind-the-scenes positions, 92% of
directors were white and 8% were minorities—4% black, 1% Latino,
2% Asian, 0% Native American, and 0% Mixed/Other.120 For casting
directors, the results revealed 85% were white, 11% were Unknown,
and 4% were minorities—2% black, 1% Latino, 1% Asian, 0%
Native American, and 0% Mixed/Other.121 For screenwriters, 95%

120. Chong, supra note 3, at 34.
121. Id.
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were white and 5% were minorities—2% black, 2% Latino, 1%
Asian, 0% Native American, and 0% Mixed/Other.122
MOVIES RESULTS
Behind-the-Camera Representation
Movies

Directors

Casting
Directors

Screenwriters

U.S.
Population in
2014

White

92%
(+14.64)

85%
(+7.64)

95%
(+17.64)

77.36%

Black

4%
(-9.22)

2%
(-11.22)

2%
(-11.22)

13.22%

Latino

1%
(-16.37)

1%
(-16.37)

2%
(-15.37)

17.37%

Asian

2%
(-3.62)

1%
(-4.62)

1%
(-4.62)

5.62%

Native
American

0%
(-1.24)

0%
(-1.24)

0%
(-1.24)

1.24%

Mixed/Other

0%
(N/A)

0%
(N/A)

0%
(N/A)

N/A

Unknown

0%
(N/A)

11%
(N/A)

0%
(N/A)

N/A

Total
Minorities

8%
(-15.00)

4%
(-19.00)

5%
(-18.00)

23%

In the television shows category for behind-the-scenes positions,
97% of directors were white and 3% were minorities—1% black, 2%
Latino, 0% Asian, 0% Native American, and 0% Mixed/Other.123 For
casting directors, the results revealed 100% were white and 0% were

122. Id.
123. Id.
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minorities.124 For screenwriters, 95% were white and 5% were
minorities—1% black, 3% Latino, 1% Asian, 0% Native American,
and 0% Mixed/Other.125
TV SHOWS RESULTS
Behind-the-Camera Representation
Screenwriters

U.S.
Population
in 2014

TV Shows

Directors

Casting
Directors

White

97%
(+19.64)

100%
(+22.64)

95%
(+17.64)

77.36%

Black

1%
(-12.22)

0%
(-13.22)

1%
(-12.22)

13.22%

Latino

2%
(-15.37)

0%
(-17.37)

3%
(-14.37)

17.37%

Asian

0%
(-5.62)

0%
(-5.62)

1%
(-4.62)

5.62%

Native
American

0%
(-1.24)

0%
(-1.24)

0%
(-1.24)

1.24%

Mixed/Other

0%
(N/A)

0%
(N/A)

0%
(N/A)

N/A

Unknown

0%
(N/A)

0%
(N/A)

0%
(N/A)

N/A

Total
Minorities

3%
(-20.00)

0%
(-23.00)

5%
(-18.00)

23%

Finally, my research updated Russell Robinson’s 2007 casting-call
numbers by analyzing the specific race of 488 casting calls on
backstage.com from January 2015 to May 2015.126 The results were
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Chong, supra note 3, at 43.

Published by Reading Room, 2019

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 2

626

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

similar to Robinson’s 2007 statistics on IMDb with 39% white, 10%
black, 11% Latino, 4% Asian, 2% Native American or Middle
Eastern, 8% multiple races specified, and 26% race not specified.127
According to industry standards, race not specified means “white.”128
Thus, the final statistics were 65% white.129 Although the industry
improved since 2007, whites still received sixteen times more
employment opportunities than minorities in film.130
CASTING CALLS
White

Black

Latinos

Asians

Native American
and Middle
Eastern

65%

10%

11%

4%

2%

Multiple
Races
8%

Where Are the Asians in Hollywood? revealed that after more than
fifty years of attempting to resolve the underrepresentation and
misrepresentation of minorities, the problem is still prevalent in
society.131 This article acknowledges that the FCC supports
ownership, equal employment, and ascertainment policies, but the
data from my study proves the FCC’s methods are not working.
E. Legislation is Necessary to Improve the Representation of
Minorities in Films
My research study recognizes that Hollywood has improved
because the film industry originally had no minorities as owners of
TV stations and radio stations, no minorities cast for on-screen roles,
and no minorities in leadership positions behind the camera.132
However, the increase is not significant enough. As a nation that
promotes itself as a melting pot of cultures, we do not want to be
127. Id. at 43–44.
128. Leonard M. Baynes, WHITE OUT: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of Color by the
Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 311 (2003).
129. Chong, supra note 3, at 44.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 33.
132. Id. at 44.
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subpar in our diversity standards. This article argues that the
entertainment industry’s current failure to reach parity is likely due to
three reasons: (1) existing regulations are not aggressively enforced
and create loopholes for employers, (2) government policies focus on
regulating the wrong area of Hollywood, and (3) courts believe that
First Amendment rights are more significant than promoting diversity
or equal employment.
1. Existing Regulations Are Not Aggressively Enforced and
Create Loopholes
Hollywood often flies under the Title VII and § 1981 radar
because whether directors, casting directors, screenwriters, actors,
and actresses are employees or independent contractors is a common
topic of debate.133 In the movie category, it is more likely that the
film industry employs people as independent contractors because the
creation of the film is a temporary project.134 However, in the
television category, many series are ongoing, and the relationship
with the cast and crew is not a one-time interaction.135 The gray area
in determining whether someone is an employee or independent
contractor makes it difficult for courts to determine if minorities
attempting to break into film are protected under existing labor
laws.136
Moreover, Title VII and § 1981 address employment
discrimination generally and do not target one industry.137 As a
result, many injured parties are unaware that the entertainment
industry’s practices are illegal because no specific law refers to
Hollywood’s practices. In addition, most individuals searching for
stable careers in Hollywood are unlikely to enforce their rights;
struggling actors and actresses who fall victim to casting-call
133. Kurtis Anton, The Debate of Independent Contractor or Employee in Filmmaking, LINKEDIN
(Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/debate-independent-contractor-employee-filmmakingkurtis-anton [https://perma.cc/4YR6-3VEJ].
134. Id.
135. See Chong, supra note 3, at 54.
136. See id.
137. See generally Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2018).
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discrimination normally do not have the financial means to fight the
large film companies.138 Hollywood is also an insular network, and
creating enemies through lawsuits almost guarantees that the actor or
actress will be blacklisted. The ambiguity and lack of litigation have
allowed our governing bodies to avoid having to harshly enforce the
laws against film leaders who violate discrimination laws, leaving
this area of law underdeveloped.139
2. Congressional Action Should Focus on Creation of Films
and Not Only Ownership
A true change in our media requires Congress to diversify the
artists in the field, not only the owners of broadcast stations and cable
networks. The FCC focuses on regulating the ownership of stations
through licensees, but this only addresses the distribution of films.140
The FCC does not regulate the parties that actually create the film
content submitted to the stations.141 If the FCC manages to increase
minority ownership of stations but the selection of films available to
the distributed stations remains limited, then it will be difficult to
provide more diverse films to the public.
Congress must focus its regulatory energy on the individuals
creating and starring in the films to provide owners with more
minority-created films and nonstereotypical portrayals of minorities
on screen. This article proposes legislation that will help Congress
better regulate the artists in the film industry without violating the
First Amendment.

138. See Marie Tae McDermott, ‘I Was Blacklisted from Employment’: Speaking Up in the
Workplace, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/business/i-wasblacklisted-from-employment-speaking-up-in-the-workplace.html [https://perma.cc/7ARY-BNZV].
139. Henna Choi, white Men Still Dominate Reality Television: Discriminatory Casting and the Need
for Regulation, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. J. 163, 169 (2015).
140. See What We Do, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/N7UVYE7M] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
141. See id.
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3. Freedom of Speech Often Trumps Diversity
In 2012, the Middle District of Tennessee, in Claybrooks v. ABC,
held that casting decisions are protected by the First Amendment.142
The Claybrooks decision is a prime example of a court ruling that the
First Amendment is more important than diversity without
Congressional support or guidance for the decision.143 In fact, as
discussed above, Congress has indicated that diversity is equally
important through its regulation of the broadcast, cable, and film
industries.144 Congress explicitly recognized that “the effects of past
inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have
resulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of
mass communications” and justified the minority ownership policies
of the FCC as “primarily to promote programming diversity.”145
Congress and the Supreme Court have agreed that “diversity is an
important governmental objective” that justifies preferential
treatment on the basis of race.146 Nevertheless, the court in
Claybrooks determined that diversity was not a priority.147 To
remedy the Claybrooks decision and ensure other courts do not make
similar mistakes, Congress should actively make its viewpoint
understood by the judiciary through legislative action.
Some scholars believe that the market will naturally correct the
lack of diversity in Hollywood148 but, as shown in the data from my
research study, it has taken minorities over 100 years to simply gain a
foothold in the American film industry.149 Without help from our
country’s leaders, reaching parity is not in the near future. Legislative
action or harsher enforcement of employment advertisement policies
is necessary to help us reach an acceptable standard of minority
representation within our lifetimes.
142. Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Co., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 999 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
143. See Chong, supra note 3, at 42–53.
144. See discussion supra Part I.D.
145. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
146. Id.
147. Chong, supra note 3, at 52.
148. Id. at 52–53.
149. Id. at 52.
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II. Content-Based Regulation: Casting Calls Must Be Race Neutral
First, this section argues that race-specific casting calls are illegal
speech under Title VII and should receive no protection under the
First Amendment.150 Second, this section explains pertinent freedom
of speech doctrines and presents a regulation that will pass the First
Amendment’s strict scrutiny standard even though it requires casting
calls to be race neutral.151
A. Under Title VII 2000e-3(b), Race Specific Casting Calls Are
Illegal, Unprotected Speech
Title VII explicitly states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . [or] employment
agency . . . to print . . . or cause to be printed or published any notice
or advertisement relating to employment . . . indicating any
preference . . . based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”152 Although a casting call is a published notice related to
employment that indicates a preference based on race, sex, color, or
national origin, casting calls have not been ruled as an illegal hiring
practice.153 On the contrary, casting calls have been and still are a
common practice in the movie and television industry for finding
actors and actresses.154
Leaders in Hollywood have openly admitted that casting is not
always about talent but rather about finding the person who best fits
the casting call.155 A casting call is a synopsis that includes the script
and character descriptions that often state the character’s desired
race.156 Some casting calls do not specify a race, but others
150. See infra Part II.A.
151. See infra Part II.B.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2018).
153. See Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and
Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007).
154. Id.
155. Baynes, supra note 127, at 311; see also Debbie Sikkema, What Is a Breakdown? (Showbiz Term
of the Day), YOUR YOUNG ACTOR (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.youryoungactor.com/2009/12/07/what-isa-breakdown-showbiz-term-of-the-day/#sthash.WdrKnqjk.dpuf
[https://perma.cc/VMZ7-Z9H8]
(defining breakdown as a synopsis of the project that includes the script with character descriptions).
156. See Baynes, supra note 127, at 311.
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specifically ask for a white actor or actress.157 Nine out of ten times,
if the race is unspecified, the role goes to a white person because
casting directors eliminate people of color by default.158 Although
courts have acknowledged that television broadcasters can be subject
to labor-relations law, such as discriminatory employment
practices,159 studios and other power players in the film industry have
not been reprimanded for violating these laws and continue to use
discriminatory job postings.160
Hollywood argues that it is exempt from the Court’s strong policy
against discriminatory advertising because the First Amendment
protects its actions.161 However, this assertion has limited merit
because courts have prohibited discriminatory advertising in other
industries despite defendants’ First Amendment concerns, such as the
housing industry and printed press.162 For example, in Ragin v. New
York Times Co., the Second Circuit held that the New York Times
Company (the Times) violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968 because
it published an advertisement for the sale and rental of a dwelling that
indicated a preference based on race.163
In Ragin, during the twenty-year period after the Fair Housing Act
was passed, the Times featured thousands of human models, but
virtually none were black.164 The few blacks depicted were
maintenance employees and doormen, but blacks were never
portrayed as potential homeowners.165 The court confirmed that
liability for racial discrimination could be viewed in the aggregate
and deemed the Times’s twenty-year pattern of only depicting white
homeowners a powerful engine for housing segregation.166 The court
also stated that allowing the Times to discriminate based on effects

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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Robinson, supra note 152, at 43–44.
Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 998. (2d Cir. 1991).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1002.
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would undermine civil rights laws such as Title VII, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race in employment.167
The Times tried to argue that allowing racially conscious decisions
would make racial quotas in advertising a reality, but the court
rejected the argument.168 The court stated that, unlike college
admissions, where the quota argument was entertained, “advertising
is a make-up-your-own world in which one builds an image from
scratch, selecting those portrayals that will attract targeted consumers
and discarding those that will put them off.”169 Academia deals with
real-life, competitive situations where individual skills and academic
criteria should govern decisions.170 Although racial decisions are
inevitable in advertising, the law still requests advertisers to make
choices that will not create a suggestion of racial preference.171
In today’s society, Hollywood’s race-specific casting procedures
resemble the same “make-up-your-own-world” practice discussed in
Ragin and have contributed to nondiverse casts and segregated
programming.172 Similar to the Times, Hollywood has made First
Amendment arguments to protect the industry’s practice of
employment advertising for only white actors or actresses.173 Unlike
the Times, however, Hollywood has been allowed to post
discriminatory, race-specific casting calls for more than twenty years
because courts and legislators have entertained Hollywood’s claims
that prohibiting certain casting decisions will negatively impact the
content of films.174 To remedy this problem, courts and Congress
must realize that requiring race-neutral casting calls will not impact
the artist’s final casting decisions; requiring race-neutral casting calls
167. Id. at 1004.
168. Id. at 1000–01.
169. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1001.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1000. The Times also argued that the government should not be able to regulate advertising
decisions based on race because racially discriminatory advertising would lead to a multitude of
plaintiffs suing for damage awards that would impair the press’s role in society. Id. at 1004. The court
rejected this argument and reasoned that no device exists to determine if this possibility is credible or
baseless and that the speculative nature of the assertion was not a reason to immunize publishers from
discriminatory behavior. Id. at 1005.
172. Id. at 1001.
173. Chong, supra note 3, at 52, 57.
174. Id. at 56.
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merely creates opportunities for more people of color to appear in
front of the casting director, screenwriter, and director to prove that
they are qualified for the role.
Another example is Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations, where the Court held that the
newspaper’s advertisements in sex-specific columns were
unprotected commercial speech because they expressed no social
policy or expression of ideas.175 The newspaper had allowed
employers to place help-wanted advertisements in sex-designated
columns, such as “Male Help Wanted” or “Jobs—Female Interest,”
even though the jobs advertised obviously had no sex-based bona
fide occupational qualifications.176 The Court ordered Pittsburgh
Press to revamp its employment advertisement section because the
current advertisements did not discuss why certain positions ought to
be filled by members of one sex over another.177 The newspaper’s
advertisements were considered a “classic example[] of [illegal]
commercial speech” because they advocated for discrimination in
employment; the editorial judgment of whether to accept an
advertisement and place it in the correct column did not strip the
commercial advertising of its commercial character.178
The Supreme Court rejected Pittsburgh Press’s First Amendment
argument and ordered the newspaper to use a classification system
with no reference to sex.179 Although the ordinance did impact the
newspaper’s editing of the help-wanted section and could be viewed
as impacting the newspaper’s content, the Court analogized the sexbased discrimination advertisements to defamatory speech.180 The
Court held that the First Amendment did not protect the newspaper’s
discriminatory editorial decisions because the First Amendment
would not shield a newspaper from punishment for libel when actual
malice and falsity existed.181 The Court further analogized Pittsburgh
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
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Press’s actions to ads proposing the sale of narcotics or soliciting
prostitutes, which could also be constitutionally forbidden.182 Based
on the reasoning above, the Court held that the Constitution
prohibited Pittsburgh Press’s commercial practice of allowing
employers to post employment ads with a sex preference.183
Hollywood’s casting calls are identical to the illegal job postings
in Pittsburgh Press184 and should not be treated any differently. Title
VII states that employment advertisements specifying a race are
illegal.185 If Pittsburgh Press was not allowed to post jobs that
specified a preference based on gender—a quasi-suspect class—then
Hollywood should not be allowed to advertise for actors and
actresses of a specific race, a suspect class. Pittsburgh Press also
confirmed that the First Amendment is not a complete shield for any
discriminatory action involving creative discretion.186 The Court
regulated the content of the Pittsburgh newspaper, which indirectly
affected who would advertise in the newspaper.187 Similarly, courts
should be able to regulate the content of casting calls, even if
regulation indirectly impacts who will audition and be cast in the
film. Free speech proponents who believe casting regulation would
impact a film’s tone and message are incorrect because whether a
doctor is black, Asian, white, or Native American does not impact a
storyline focused on a doctor saving people, two people falling in
love, or everyday life scenarios.
In conclusion, in both Ragin and Pittsburgh Press, the courts
required the newspapers to monitor the ads that they received and
avoid indicating a racial or gender preference.188 The courts held that
requiring the advertisements to be race and gender neutral did not
impose an unconstitutional burden on the press and would not disrupt
182. Id. at 388.
183. Id.
184. “Just Mercy” Starring Jamie Foxx—Kids & Teens, AUDITIONSFINDER (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.auditionsfinder.com/new/just-mercy-starring-jamie-foxx-kids-teens/
[https://perma.cc/83ML-AVXT].
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2018).
186. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386 (1973).
187. Id. at 389.
188. Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991).
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the press’s traditional role of editorial control and free expression of
views.189 Title VII is identical.190 There is no specific reason why an
Asian person cannot be cast as a superhero or an FBI agent over a
white person. The U.S. has an established precedent of ruling against
discriminatory advertising,191 and regulators should recognize that
the current practice of casting calls in Hollywood is illegal under
Title VII.
However, this article recognizes that advocating for enforcement
of a law that has existed for more than fifty years and has been
consistently neglected is unlikely to fix Hollywood’s illegal casting
process in a timely manner. Thus, to speed up the process, this article
advocates for creating a specific law related to casting calls to
provide a concrete cause of action for artists who suffer
discrimination. A new law would send a strong message of
deterrence to entertainment industry leaders who have continued
discriminatory hiring practices.
This article proposes the following language:
To promote equal employment opportunities for minorities,
all casting calls must be race neutral unless the race of the
character is essential (1) to the storyline, (2) to preserve
historical or regional accuracy, or (3) to maintain the
network’s identity-themed programming. If none of the
three exceptions apply, then the race of the actor or actress
is likely insignificant and does not need to be specified on
the employment advertisement.
To stop the practice of race-specific casting calls, Congress must
specify that race-specific casting calls are illegal. If our government
fears that including casting calls as an employment advertisement
could violate the First Amendment, there is no merit in that fear. The
First Amendment provides no protection for illegal commercial
189. Id.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b).
191. Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 388; Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1003.
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speech or activity that shows a preference on the basis of race, such
as deceptive advertising or commercial speech related to any illegal
activity.192 As shown in Ragin and Pittsburgh Press, any type of
racial discrimination in advertising is likely considered an illegal
activity.193 Thus, the freedom of speech will not protect employers
who only want a white actor, actress, director, casting director, or
screenwriter. The next section discusses this issue in detail.194
B. Requiring Race-Neutral Casting Calls Does Not Violate the
First Amendment
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”195 The Supreme Court
acknowledged that the First Amendment protects “entertainment, as
well as political and ideological speech” and that a “‘particularized
message’ is not required for speech to be constitutionally
protected.”196 Entertainment work includes scripts, storyboards,
storylines, character development, dialogue, sounds, graphic design,
concept art, sounds, music, narratives, video games, motion pictures,
editorial opinions of newspapers, and broadcasts on controversial
issues of public importance.197 However, the reality is that “[t]otally
unlimited free will . . . is not allowed in our or any other society.”198
“The First Amendment’s guaranty is not absolute”199 and has varying
standards of review depending on the speech involved.200
192. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999.
193. See, e.g., id. at 1003.
194. See infra Part II.B.
195. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 584 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
196. Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty., 329 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2003); see also
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
197. Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 957; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of
Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 381–82 (1984); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977);
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76–77 (1976).
198. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 586.
199. Id. at 584; see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 318 (1977) (“Although offensive or
misleading statements in a political oration cannot be censored, offensive language in a courtroom or
misleading representations in a securities prospectus may surely be regulated. Nuisances such as sound
trucks and erotic displays in a residential area may be abated under appropriately flexible civil standards
even though the First Amendment provides a shield against criminal prosecution.”) (footnotes omitted).
200. Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 958.
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To determine if a regulation requiring casting calls to be raceneutral would violate the First Amendment, the courts must
categorize the type of speech limited by the regulation and then apply
the appropriate scrutiny.201 If the regulation requires parties to
examine the content of the message to determine if the views
expressed violate it, then the regulation is content based,202 which
means which means that the regulation is presumptively invalid203
and must pass strict scrutiny.204 The government bears the burden of
demonstrating that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly tailored to achieve that end by
putting the least possible burden on expression.205
Hollywood would likely argue that requiring race-neutral casting
calls is a content-based regulation because the regulation impacts the
text of the casting breakdown, which can indirectly impact the
message of some films. Many directors claim that the race of an actor
or actress can play a vital role in the film’s overall composition,206
but this argument has limited merit. Storylines can be developed
without a racial component. For example, whether two teenagers
attending high school are black, white, or Asian does not matter if
there is no interracial component to the message conveyed by the
film. Thus, although casting calls likely deserve some protection, as
discussed in Section II-A, Hollywood’s admission that it
purposefully
posts
racially
discriminatory
employment
advertisements justifies reviewing the race-neutral regulation under a
lower standard because the discriminatory ads are illegal speech.
This section makes two arguments. First, if race-specific casting
calls are protected under the First Amendment, courts should apply a
lower standard of review, similar to obscene speech and commercial
speech.207 Second, if courts determine that race-specific casting calls

201.
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deserve the highest protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution, then
requiring race-neutral casting calls passes strict scrutiny.208
1. Similar to Obscene and Commercial Speech, Discriminatory
Casting Calls that Perpetuate Discriminatory Messages in
Films Deserve Less First Amendment Protection
Films with a nondiverse cast or minorities cast in stereotypical
roles deserve limited protection because they can create implicit
biases in children that negatively impact the children’s development.
This policy of protecting children can be easily analogized to
America’s current regulation of (a) obscene speech and (b)
commercial speech.
a) Obscene Speech: No First Amendment Protection
The First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of
erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value.209 However,
when the speech is so obscene that it is of such slight social value
that it is outweighed by the compelling interest of society, then the
obscene speech has no protection under the First Amendment210 and
can be regulated by the federal and state governments by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s police power.211 The government’s interest
in the “well-being of its youth” and in supporting parents’ claims to
authority in their own households justifies the regulation of obscene
speech.212 If a statute regulates unprotected obscenity, mere
rationality is sufficient to satisfy due process.213
Courts reason that the lower standard of review is appropriate
because obscene materials can distort or reduce the quality of
“human existence.”214 There is a universal belief that good art can lift
the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 41–42.
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 584 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973).
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 586.
Paris, 413 U.S. at 63.
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develop character.215 Thus, state legislatures can assume that obscene
art can similarly lead to corruptive or antisocial behavior and
encourage extreme, promiscuous behavior among children, which
would result in the children receiving disapproval from most people
in society.216 Legislatures have concluded that a “sensitive, key
relationship of human existence” that is “central to family life,
community welfare, and the development of human personality, can
be . . . distorted by [the] crass commercial exploitation of sex.”217
The government’s reasoning for analyzing obscene speech under a
lower standard of rational basis can easily be applied to
discriminatory art that portrays minorities in stereotypical roles or
race-specific casting calls that indicate people of color are not a
desirable commodity in Hollywood. For example, in Skyywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, the Southern District of Florida held that
material lacking serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,
is not something that the law calls art; on the contrary, works that
include discrimination and obscenity are works that the law calls a
crime.218 Skyywalker looked at an artist’s recording that included
riffs, rhythm, and explicit sexual lyrics.219 After the court examined
the piece as a whole to determine its social value it ruled that once
the riffs were removed, the remaining rhythm and lyrics had no
redeeming social value.220 The court confirmed that regulation of
obscene speech is allowed because both the federal and state
governments “banned prostitution, incest, rape, and other sexually
related conduct.”221
If legislatures applied the same logic used in Skyywalker,
discriminatory art and casting calls would have no “redeeming social
value” after common ideas, such as the basic storyline or character
arch, are removed and the racial classification would be all that
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remains.222 The remaining racially discriminatory casting call could
be regulated because the federal government has made race-specific
employment advertisements and discriminatory hiring practices
illegal under Title VII.223 Governments have regulated obscene
speech because it is linked to illegal conduct, such as sexual assault
and rape;224 governments should regulate discriminatory speech
because it is linked to discriminatory conduct, such as employment
discrimination and racism.225
Courts have even ruled that “the use of the F-word [can be]
indecent” because it is “one of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit
descriptions of sexual activity in the English language,” and exposure
to it “could [enlarge] a child’s vocabulary in an instant.”226 Courts
allow the FCC to regulate broadcasts of the F-word if children might
be in the audience, even if used as a fleeting expletive and not in a
sustained or repeated manner.227 Similarly, brief exposure to a
stereotypical portrayal of a minority or no exposure to minorities on
television can impact a child’s psyche and cause the child to develop
a skewed view of minorities that can lead to intolerance in the form
of racism, fear, or implicit biases.
Another example is Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.228 In Paris, the
Court permitted the regulation of obscene material in local commerce
to promote the public’s interests in maintaining a high quality of life,
a comfortable community environment, and the public’s safety.229
The Supreme Court upheld a law that allowed states to regulate the
commerce of pornographic films, even in public places of
accommodation like “‘adult’ theatres” that excluded minors230 and
displayed warning signs, such as, “You must be 21 and able to prove
222. Id. at 596.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2018).
224. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 586.
225. Choi, supra note 138, at 165.
226. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 248 (2012); Complaints Against Various
Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975,
4976–79 (2004).
227. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978).
228. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 49 (1973).
229. Id. at 57–58.
230. Id. at 69.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/2

36

Chong: Back to the Drawing Board! Legislating Hollywood

2019]

LEGISLATING HOLLYWOOD

641

it. If viewing the nude body offends you, Please Do Not Enter.”231
The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that pornographic films
had constitutional immunity under the First Amendment232 because
the state’s interest to regulate exposure of obscene materials to
juveniles and nonconsenting adults was of high importance.233 The
Court was not swayed by the argument that the government must
protect a consenting person’s privacy interest to view obscene films
in places of public accommodation.234
Similar to Paris, our state and federal legislatures should be able to
regulate discriminatory speech because the public exhibition or
commerce of offensive material can injure the community as a whole
and jeopardize the state’s right to maintain a decent society.235 As
seen during the recent election of President Donald Trump, the
careless use of offensive speech can cause unrest and tension in the
community.236 To eliminate the promotion of hate and intolerance,
our government must look at the root of the problem, which likely
lies in the media and films shown to society—especially to children
and teenagers.
Unfortunately, the ideas that stereotypical portrayals are offensive
speech or that race-specific casting calls discourage minorities to
231. Id. at 52.
232. Id. at 57.
233. Id.
234. Paris, 413 U.S. at 68. Another example appeared in Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, where the Court upheld a provision that allowed cable
operators to prohibit programming that the “‘operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary community
standards.’” Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 733, 734 (1996)
(quoting 1992 Act, § 10(a)(2), 106 Stat. 1486). The Court needed to balance the competing interest of
protecting children from exposure to patently offensive sex-related materials and a cable operator’s right
to editorial freedom in the selection of what programs to offer its subscribers. Id. at 743. Ultimately, the
Court determined that a regulation that allowed cable operators to exclude obscene material on leased
channels did not violate the First Amendment because it was permissive and restored the editorial
control that operators normally possessed before Congress required access channels and the regulation
was viewpoint neutral. Id. at 747.
235. Paris, 413 U.S. at 69.
236. Colby Itkowitz, An Expert on ‘Dangerous Speech’ Explains How Trump’s Rhetoric and the
Recent Spate of Violence Are and Aren’t Linked, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/29/professor-who-defined-dangerous-speech-howtrumps-rhetoric-pittsburgh-are-linked/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ecc28c3235dd
[https://perma.cc/VJQ4-2JUX].
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audition are less likely to be accepted by the majority. In 2014,
minorities were 38% of the population and held limited positions of
power in our government.237 This means that the majority of our
nation’s leaders and the remaining 62% of the U.S. population
includes individuals who are less likely to be offended by Asians
portrayed as nerds with
“slanty” eyes, blacks and Hispanics in gangs, or Native Americans
with feathers on their heads.238 To the majority, stereotypical
portrayals or discriminatory hiring might even be considered normal
or a common strategic business practice. As a result, they are more
likely to direct their energy towards initiatives that relate to their
personal experiences.
Where are the Asians in Hollywood? discussed why the First
Amendment was viewed as more important than the Fourteenth
Amendment; the majority can more easily relate to the ideas of free
speech than to ideas of diversity.239 When comparing the majority’s
relatability to the impact of obscene art versus discrimination, the
results are the same; it is likely that the majority can relate to the idea
of protecting their children from obscenity more easily than the idea
of protecting minorities from discrimination.240 This relatability-toissues phenomenon is why U.S. governments have regulated obscene
speech but not Hollywood’s discriminatory casting or stereotypical
portrayals of minorities.241 Almost everyone can identify with
protecting children because the color of a person’s skin does not
impact a person’s parental desires to protect their child.242
237. Minority Representation, FAIR VOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/minority_representation
[https://perma.cc/4KSZ-LV4L] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018); Kendra Yoshinaga, Babies of Color Are Now
the Majority, Census Says, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 1, 2016, 12:49 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/07/01/484325664/babies-of-color-are-now-the-majority-censussays [https://perma.cc/NZ7L-TFKJ].
238. Hannah Fingerhut, In ‘Political Correctness’ Debate, Most Americans Think Too Many People
Are Easily Offended, PEW RES. CTR. (July 20, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/07/20/in-political-correctness-debate-most-americans-think-too-many-people-are-easilyoffended/ [https://perma.cc/SSS5-5XPW].
239. See Chong, supra note 3, at 56.
240. See Paris, 413 U.S. at 69.
241. See id.
242. See
Protecting
Children’s
Rights,
UNICEF
(May
19,
2014),
https://www.unicef.org/crc/index_protecting.html [https://perma.cc/7QCV-FFJ7].
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However, the white majority, which controls our government,243 is
less able to understand how discriminatory employment
advertisements and films can create negative environments for
minorities and limit the appearance of minorities on screen, which
creates antisocial behavior among our youth in the form of explicit
and implicit biases against minorities.244 Courts allow the
government to regulate expressive conduct, such as nude dancing.245
Thus, expressive films should not be treated differently, especially if
further regulation can eliminate discriminatory speech and protect
society’s morality.246 Society must push the government to recognize
that Hollywood’s race-specific casting calls and stereotypical films
are a form of discriminatory expression that should be discouraged.
b) Commercial Speech: Rational Basis Review
Similar to obscene speech, the Constitution accords less protection
to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression, such as the news.247 To determine if speech is
commercial, the courts must look to more than just the aspects of
sales, solicitation, payment, financial motivation of the advertiser,
and the relationship of speech to the activity;248 the courts must
balance the value of the speech against the public interest served by
the regulation.249 For example, if an advertisement focuses only on an
exchange of services, then it is likely considered pure commercial
advertising that is unprotected,250 such as paid commercial
advertisements that are driven by the solicitor’s desire for gainful
sales or occupation.251

243. Anna Brown & Sara Atske, blacks Have Made Gains in U.S. Political Leadership, but Gaps
Remain, PEW RES. CTR. (June 28, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/28/blackshave-made-gains-in-u-s-political-leadership-but-gaps-remain/ [https://perma.cc/S42Y-JCNY].
244. See Chong, supra note 3, at 30, 77.
245. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991).
246. See id.
247. Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991).
248. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975).
249. Id. at 822.
250. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
251. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 630 (1980).
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However, if an advertisement mainly focuses on the exchanging of
ideas, then its mere advertisement characteristic will not be
determinative of whether it deserves First Amendment protection.252
Courts have clarified that legal commercial speech, such as charitable
solicitations,253 is afforded some degree of protection—even paid
advertisements—because some advertisements might convey
information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience.254
The First Amendment provides no protection for illegal
commercial speech, such as deceptive advertising, activities showing
a racial preference, and commercial speech related to any illegal
activity.255 However, legal commercial speech is subject to
reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest.256
Race-specific casting calls are likely illegal speech under Title VII
because the main purpose of a casting call is to obtain potential talent
for the film and not to communicate any specific ideals or
messages.257 Artists often argue that casting calls can impact the
underlying messages of the film itself because casting decisions can
change the feeling and tone of the film.258 In Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., the Court entertained
an intertwined argument when it held that a charitable solicitation
was not pure commercial speech because the solicitation was
characteristically intertwined with informative and persuasive
speech; without the solicitation, the flow of information and
advocacy from the charity would likely have ceased.259
The Court held that charitable solicitation deserved First
Amendment protection because it would be artificial and impractical
to parcel out the speech by “applying one test to one phrase and

252. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 831.
253. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 788 (1988).
254. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
255. Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991).
256. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826.
257. Robinson, supra note 152, at 4.
258. Noam Kroll, 90% of Directing Is Casting! Here’s Why You Need to Prioritize Your Talent,
NOAM KROLL FILMMAKING RESOURCE & COMMUNITY (June 26, 2014), http://noamkroll.com/90-ofdirecting-is-casting-heres-why-you-need-to-prioritize-your-talent/ [https://perma.cc/Q8NW-H6F4].
259. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
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another test to another phrase.”260 Even if the Court determined that
casting calls deserve protection because, similar to charitable
solutions, the ads are intertwined with the film’s message, this article
argues that Congress can still impose regulations using a rationalbasis review because films are commercial speech rather than mere
expressive speech.
A large part of the entertainment industry is driven by the need to
make money.261 Hollywood defines the success of a film by the
amount of sales during its opening weekend or the number of
viewers.262 Although there are several films created as pure
expressions without regard to making a profit, such as independent
films, Hollywood does not define success by the strength of its
message.263 As a result, Hollywood’s films and casting calls are more
likely commercial speech and should be reviewed with a lower level
of scrutiny.
In Associated Press v. NLRB, the Court recognized that the
commercial aspects of newsgathering and publishing were different
from the editorial function and upheld that the newsgathering
organization must follow the National Labor Relations Act despite its
First Amendment objections.264 The Court also subjected the
newspaper to antitrust laws265 and provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.266 This suggests that regulation of organizations that
have aspects of commercial speech and artistic speech are not
necessarily subject to a heightened scrutiny and that casting calls that

260. Id.
261. Adam Davidson, How Does the Film Industry Actually Make Money?, N.Y. TIMES (June 26,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/magazine/how-does-the-film-industry-actually-makemoney.html [https://perma.cc/73ZG-YX8K].
262. Colin Moreshead, Hollywood Is Now Making Films for Foreign Markets, and Their Taste in
Movies
Is
Awful,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Sept.
18,
2012,
10:08
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/hollywood-is-making-films-for-foreign-markets-2012-9
[https://perma.cc/6GSC-YFPM].
263. Sean Fennessey, The End of Independent Film as We Know It, RINGER (Apr. 10, 2017, 11:49
AM),
https://www.theringer.com/2017/4/10/16044256/netflix-amazon-studios-independent-filmsundance-5def390a69ef [https://perma.cc/XMF2-6ZHN].
264. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128–29 (1937).
265. Ind. Farmer’s Guide Publ’g Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publ’g Co., 293 U.S. 268, 271 (1934).
266. Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 196 (1962).

Published by Reading Room, 2019

41

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 2

646

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

possess artistic and commercial value should not automatically
receive heightened scrutiny.
2. If Courts Apply Strict Scrutiny, the Regulation is Narrowly
Tailored to Serve Multiple Compelling Government Interests
The purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public
authority from assuming guardianship of the public mind through
regulating press, speech, and religion.267 The First Amendment
mandates that the government “not interfere [with expressions of
First Amendment freedoms] on the ground that [it] view[s] a
particular expression as unwise or irrational.”268 Even with the purest
motives, the government cannot substitute its judgment as to how
best to speak for the public,269 especially in areas where the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style largely to the
individual.270
However, the Court has stated that the government’s interest “in
protecting societal order and morality” is a substantial interest.271
Courts have reasoned that society’s moral views are enough to justify
a statute that reaches a significant amount of protective expressive
activity.272 Past prohibitions that have been upheld in American
society on the basis of protecting order and morality include
“sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use,
prostitution, and sodomy.”273 Similarly, discriminatory casting calls
are expressive activities that violate society’s morality because the
race-specific casting calls promote unequal employment
opportunities.274 But if the courts determine that commercial, race267. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 791 (1988).
268. Id. at 790–91 (quoting Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107,
124 (1981)); see also Democratic Party of U.S., 450 U.S. at 124 (criticizing the state’s paternalistic
interest in protecting the political process by restricting speech by corporations); Linmark Assocs., Inc.
v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1977) (criticizing, in the commercial speech context, the state’s
paternalistic interest in maintaining the quality of neighborhoods by restricting speech to residents).
269. Riley, 487 U.S. at 791.
270. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 593–94 (1991).
271. Id. at 560.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 575.
274. See id. at 569.
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specific casting calls are fully protected because they can impact the
underlying message of a film, this section argues that requiring raceneutral casting calls still survives strict scrutiny because the proposed
statute focuses on casting advertisements, which are a small portion
of the film, and not casting decisions. Moreover, the statute requiring
race-neutral casting calls furthers the compelling government
interests of protecting (a) a minority’s right to earn a living and (b)
America’s children from discriminatory, stereotypical portrayals of
minorities.275
a) Right to Earn a Living
A minority’s right to practice his or her profession as an artist in
Hollywood is a fundamental right,276 and race-neutral casting calls
are necessary to protect a minority’s right to earn a living. The
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.277
Courts have explained that “[l]iberty means more than freedom
from servitude, and the constitutional guarantee is an assurance that
the citizen shall be protected in the right to use his powers of mind
and body in any lawful calling.”278 If a man is deprived of the right to
labor, his liberty is restricted because his capacity to earn wages and
acquire property is lessened.279 Thus, the right to earn a living is an

275. See Robinson, supra note 152, at 1. To promote equal employment opportunities for minorities,
all casting calls must be race neutral unless the race of the character is essential (1) to the storyline, (b)
to preserve historical or regional accuracy, or (3) to maintain the network’s identity-themed
programming. If the three exceptions do not apply, then the race of the actor or actress is likely
insignificant and does not need to be specified on the employment advertisement. Id.
276. See Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. Bureau of Sec. and Investigative Servs., 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d
173, 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“The right to practice one’s profession is a fundamental vested
right . . . .”).
277. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
278. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 322 (1976).
279. Id.
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important interest and requires the courts to look at reasons for
depriving people of their jobs carefully.280
The Supreme Court has held that “the right of the individual . . . to
engage in any of the common occupations of life” is the “very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”281 Justice
Douglas explicitly stated:
Employment is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, benefits that
governments offer in modern-day life. When something as valuable
as the opportunity to work is at stake, the government may not
reward some citizens and not others without demonstrating that its
actions are fair and equitable. And it is procedural due process that is
our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection against
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government action.282
Unfortunately, courts have also admitted that private employers
are free to act capriciously and unreasonably with respect to
employment practices unless statutory or contractual laws govern
their actions.283 Thus, even though the Supreme Court established
that the government may only act fairly and reasonably with respect
to employment opportunities,284 the Court provides a free pass for
private employers, which Hollywood currently uses to its advantage.
Thus, because Congress has the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the Fourteenth Amendment,285 Congress should require
race-neutral casting calls to promote a minority’s fundamental right
to work in Hollywood.
The major obstacle is that the freedom of expression is also a
fundamental right,286 which often creates a conflict between equal
protection and the freedom of speech.287 However, case precedent
280. Id. at 323.
281. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572, 588 (1972) (quoting Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
282. Id. at 589.
283. Id. at 588.
284. Id.
285. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
286. KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571, 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
287. See id.
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and past regulation shows that courts have held that the right to earn
a living is more compelling than the right to express one’s views.288
For example, the FCC requires broadcasters to ensure that their
policies promote equal employment opportunities.289 The FCC’s
equal employment rules are designed to open the door to minority
employment and participation in broadcasting in jobs that involve
more than minimal responsibility.290
In In Re Application of New Mexico Broadcasting Co., the
station’s figures showed that employment of Mexican Americans was
stagnant because in 1971 there were no minority persons employed in
the categories of officials, managers, and professionals; in 1972 there
were three; and in 1973 there were five.291 The FCC stated that it is a
problem when there is little variation in the numbers of full-time,
Mexican-American employees at the station, especially when the
total number of full-time employees increased from forty-seven to
fifty-two between 1973 and 1974 but the total number of MexicanAmerican employees remained the same at eight people.292 This
meant that there was a decrease from 17% to 15.4% in the number of
Mexican Americans working at the station.293 The FCC confirmed
that the percentage of minority employees at broadcast stations,
generally or in specific job categories, did not need to match the
percentage of minorities in the station’s service area but recognized
that statistical evidence of a substantial failure to accord equal
employment opportunities is enough to suggest that a problem exists
and warrants a hearing.294
As for employment, the station employed sixty-one persons and
only seven were Spanish surnamed, which constituted 18.6% of the
station’s total employees even though the population of Mexican

288. Id.
289. WGN of Colo., Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 413, 422 (1971); see also Equal Employment Opportunities,
47 C.F.R § 73.2080 (2018).
290. 47 C.F.R § 73.2080.
291. N.M. Broad. Co., Inc., 54 F.C.C.2d 126, 138 (1975).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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Americans in the service area was 34%.295 The station had no black
or Native-American employees even though they made up 1% and
2% of the population, respectively.296 The minority employees were
also limited to lower positions at the station and not employed in the
newsroom or management level positions; they were receptionists,
traffic clerks, and assistant bookkeepers.297 There were no MexicanAmerican newscasters in a community where more than one-third
were Mexican Americans.298
In Black Broadcasting Coalition of Richmond v. FCC, the D.C.
Circuit reversed the FCC’s renewal of WTVR’s license without a
hearing because the station’s actions during its license term showed
overt discrimination.299 The petitioners presented evidence that: (1)
WTVR employed only one part-time black employee out of sixtytwo full-time and six part-time employees at its television station and
no blacks out of the twenty-six employees at its radio stations, (2)
qualified blacks had been available for employment but were
rejected, and (3) WTVR engaged in two specific instances of
discriminatory hiring and firing of blacks.300 The court found that
WTVR’s history of 1.5% or less black employment during a license
period in an area where blacks constituted about one-fourth of the
local workforce suggested discriminatory actions that were outside
the zone of reasonableness.301 The court also found that passive
affirmative-action programs, such as simply accepting referrals from
state employment offers or using equal-opportunity employment
agencies or lists of community contacts that had little to do with
outreach, recruitment, and on the job training, were not enough to
fulfill WTVR’s obligation to recruit minority employees.302 The

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 135.
Id.
N.M. Broad. Co., Inc., 54 F.C.C.2d at 135–36.
Id. at 136.
Black Broad. Coal. of Richmond v. FCC, 556 F.2d 59, 64–65 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 62.
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court ordered the FCC to hold a full hearing to determine if the
licensee’s performance met its affirmative action obligations.303
In both Black Broadcasting and New Mexico Broadcasting, the
courts allowed the FCC to regulate the employment practices of a
broadcast company that was responsible for selecting and editing
programs that are distributed to the public.304 The court and FCC’s
decisions to make the company’s editorial function secondary to
promoting nondiscriminatory employment practices supports the
regulation requiring race-neutral casting calls in Hollywood,
especially because the employment statistics for minorities in
Hollywood are as low as in Black Broadcasting and New Mexico
Broadcasting.305 Although statistics alone do not provide ideal
evidence of discrimination, if there are specific instances of
discrimination or conscious policies of exclusion, the FCC must grant
a hearing to review the renewal of the broadcaster’s license.306
Congress must similarly review the practices in Hollywood and enact
laws that will help the industry correct its discriminatory hiring of
talent.
The right to earn a living also trumps the First Amendment in
intellectual property law.307 In Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc., the Sixth Circuit determined that the right to publicity is
essential to a person’s right to earn a living and is more important
than society’s First Amendment rights.308 The court explained that
the commercial interest of celebrities in their identities can be
valuable in the promotion of products, which meant that the famous
had an exclusive legal right during their lives to control and profit
from the commercial use of their names and personalities.309
Although the First Amendment protects the freedom to use
intellectual property, words, and ideas that are in general circulation
and not protected by valid copyright, patent, or trademark, the right
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
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See generally id.; N.M. Broad. Co., Inc., 54 F.C.C.2d 126, 135–36 (1975).
Black Broad. Coal. of Richmond, 556 F.2d at 60–61; N.M. Broad. Co., Inc., 54 F.C.C.2d at 135.
Bilingual Bicultural Coal. on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 624, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837, 841 (6th Cir. 1983).
See id.
Id. at 835, 838.
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of publicity exists to promote production of works that benefit the
public but are a product of an individual’s own talents and energy.310
Another example is San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Committee, where the Court held that Congress did not
prohibit San Francisco Arts and Athletics (SFAA) from conveying its
message when it passed a law that prohibited SFAA or any other
entity from using the word “Olympic” in certain contexts.311 The
petitioners successfully executed their athletic event under the names
“Gay Games I” and “Gay Games II” without the need for the
Olympic trademark.312 The Court clarified that Congress had a
greater interest in promoting the participation of athletes from the
U.S. in the “great four-year[] sport festival, the Olympic games,”
educating young people about the “spirit of better understanding
between each other,” and building “a better and more peaceful
world” with “international goodwill.” 313 The Court held that the
incidental restrictions on expressive speech were necessary to further
this substantial government interest314 because the U.S. Olympic
Committee’s (USOC) right to use the word “Olympic” was essential
to supplying the USOC with the means to raise money to support the
Olympics; it ensured that the USOC received benefits for its efforts
and was not confused with other organizations.315 Thus, the
regulation of allowing the USOC to have exclusive control of the
word “Olympic” was not broader than necessary to protect the
legitimate government interest and did not violate the First
Amendment.316
Similarly, copyright law protects tangible expressions of an idea
and does not violate the First Amendment because copyright laws do
not restrain the use of ideas317 but instead protect an entertainer’s
incentive to produce this type of work by granting valuable,
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. at 839, 841.
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 527–28, 536 (1987).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 538–41.
Id. at 537, 540.
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 841 (6th Cir. 1983).
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enforceable rights.318 The government believes that the “best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and investors in
‘[s]cience and useful [a]rts’” is by protecting the personal gain
obtained by personal effort.319 In fact, an entire body of intellectual
property law exists to protect a person’s right to earn a living,320
which suggests that providing equal employment opportunities is a
compelling government interest and likely more compelling than a
person’s right to expression, especially if the expression is plagued
with discriminatory stereotypes. Thus, casting calls requesting a
specific race should not be protected by the First Amendment,
especially when they violate a compelling government interest to a
minority’s right to work in the entertainment industry.
b) Protecting America’s Children from Discriminatory
Portrayals by Promoting Diversity
Nondiscriminatory, minority characters are necessary to promote
diversity and break the cycle of biases because children spend ample
time watching television, and the images, storylines, and messages
sent through television programming likely influence their
personalities and development into adults.321 The Kerner
Commission warned that “the various elements of the media ‘have
not communicated to whites a feeling for the difficulties and
frustrations of being a Negro in the United States . . . . The world that
television and newspapers offer to their black audience is almost
totally white.’”322
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that “motion pictures
possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a
community, than other modes of expression,” and that “because of its
strong and abiding interest in youth, a State may regulate the
dissemination . . . of . . . material objectionable [to juveniles that] a
318. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77 (1977).
319. Id. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
320. See generally id.
321. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744–45 (1996).
322. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 586 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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State clearly could not regulate as to adults.”323 The Court has also
recognized that society has the right to “adopt more stringent controls
on communicative materials [and general dissemination of speech]
available to youths than those available to adults” because children
do not have the full capacity for individual choice that is a
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.324 Courts have
upheld several regulations that limit radio, broadcast television, and
cable television to protect children—who are likely listeners or
viewers—from indecent and offensive material.325 Courts should
expand the regulations to cover material that promotes discrimination
against minorities.
For example, in Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis
County, the Eight Circuit agreed that the state had a compelling
interest in protecting the “psychological well-being of minors” by
reducing the harm that children suffered when playing violent video
games.326 But, the court clarified that the government must defend its
restrictions on speech with more than abstract arguments or the
possibility of the existence of a “disease sought to be cured.”327 The
government must “demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate the
harms in a direct and material way.”328 The government cannot
suppress ideas and images that the legislative body thinks are
unsuitable for children without showing “substantial supporting
evidence” that the harm will justify a law that threatens speech.329
The court found that a single psychologist referencing his study,
which indicated that playing violent video games “does in fact lead to
aggressive behavior . . . [and] more aggressive thoughts,” is a vague
generality that does not prove that the violent video games are
psychologically deleterious.330
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dall., 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968).
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757 (1978).
See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 744.
Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty., 329 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).
Id. at 959–60.
Id. at 958–59.
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In order to achieve diverse programming, race-neutral casting calls
must be required to provide minorities an opportunity to influence the
entertainment industry. But unlike the Interactive Digital Software
court, the FCC has already recognized that the viewing and listening
public suffers when minorities are underrepresented among owners
of television and radio stations:
Acute underrepresentation of minorities among the owners of
broadcast properties is troublesome because it is the licensee who is
ultimately responsible for identifying and serving the needs and
interests of his or her audience. Unless minorities are encouraged to
enter the mainstream of the commercial broadcasting business, a
substantial portion of our citizenry will remain underserved and the
larger, [nonminority] audience will be deprived of the views of
minorities.331
The Supreme Court has also stated that it is widely believed that a
diverse student body promotes educational excellence “even though
it is hard to know how, and when, and even if, this informal ‘learning
through diversity’ actually occurs.”332 The concept of a diverse
student body can be applied to diverse television because minority
viewpoints in programming serve not only the needs and interests of
the minority community but also enriches and educates the
nonminority audience, which is a key objective of the
Communications Act of 1934 and the First Amendment.333
Thus, a regulation requiring race-neutral casting calls supports the
government’s compelling interest to protect children who “may not
be able to protect themselves” from indecent speech or
discriminatory speech, which is likely to have a much “deeper and
more lasting negative effect on a child than on an adult.”334 Although
Interactive Digital Software did not uphold the regulation, it provided
a standard of review that can be applied to discriminatory films.335
331. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 554 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
332. Id. at 580.
333. Id. at 556.
334. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 758 (1978).
335. Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 959–60.

Published by Reading Room, 2019

51

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 2

656

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

Section I has already proven that representation is low,336 and the
number of examples of racism in the world are easily available
through a Google search.337
Broadcast television is uniquely accessible to children—even those
too young to read338—and must be regulated responsibly by the
government. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld
from the young without restricting the expression at its source, such
as bookstores and motion-picture theaters where the owners can
prohibit children from accessing indecent material or physically
separate the indecent material from unwilling audiences.339 But the
ease with which children can obtain access to discriminatory images
on television justifies requiring the entertainment industry to give
people of color a chance to audition for films to provide a diverse
cast. Moreover, many actors and actresses become writers and
directors in the future,340 and the more opportunity provided to
minorities to enter the field, the more likely that television will
include a variety of perspectives.
In fact, evidence presented by Congress and the FCC has
determined that an owner’s minority status (a) “influences the
selection of topics for news coverage and the presentation of editorial
viewpoint, especially on matters of particular concern to minorities”;
(b) has a special impact on the way in which images of minorities are
presented; and (c) makes it more likely that minorities will be
employed in managerial and other important roles where they can
have an impact on station policies.341 The policies adopted by the
FCC to promote diversity in programming and equal employment

336. See supra Part I.
337. See Examples of Racist Material on the Internet, AUSTRALIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (Oct.
2002),
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/examples-racist-material-internet
[https://perma.cc/FS44-UW4F].
338. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749.
339. Id.
340. Ross Bonaime, The 15 Greatest Actors-Turned-Directors, PASTE MAG. (Nov. 14, 2011, 8:07
AM),
https://www.pastemagazine.com/blogs/lists/2011/11/15-greatest-actors-turned-directors.html
[https://perma.cc/GA73-UULZ].
341. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 580–82 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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opportunity through minority ownership policies are “a product of
analysis rather than a stereotyped reaction.” 342
Moreover, “[t]he type of reasoning employed by the FCC and
Congress is not novel[] but is utilized in many areas of the law,
including the selection of jury venires on the basis of a fair cross
section[] and the reapportionment of electoral districts to preserve
minority voting strength.”343 It is a small, logical step to conclude
that including more minorities in the electromagnetic spectrum would
likely produce a “fair cross section” of diverse content.344 The FCC’s
logic should also be applied more widely to the entertainment
industry to support race-neutral casting calls, which might be a key
component to opening the door to more minorities in leadership
positions and breaking the cycle of discrimination.
Some free speech absolutists might argue that promoting diversity
as a value among our children is not a compelling government
interest, but past regulation and cases suggest otherwise.345 The Court
has held that “the right of the public to receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences
[through the medium of broadcasting] is crucial, . . . and [the First
Amendment commands that it] may not constitutionally be abridged
either by Congress or by the FCC.”346 Broadcasters engage in a vital
and independent form of communicative activity and should have
wide journalistic freedom to exercise it, consistent with their public
duties, to ensure that there is a balanced presentation of views on
diverse matters of public concern.347
In In Re Applications of Alabama Educational Television
Commission, the FCC confirmed that promoting diversity on screen
is a high priority in America.348 In Alabama Educational Television
Commission, the court held that a company’s discriminatory policies
342. Id. at 582–83.
343. Id. at 549.
344. Id. at 583.
345. Id. at 616.
346. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (quoting Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
347. Id. at 377–80.
348. See generally Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 50 F.C.C.2d 461 (1975).
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can be inferred from conduct that displays a pattern of
underrepresentation or systematic exclusion of minorities from the
broadcast licensee’s overall programming, such as refusing to present
members of an ethnic group or their views on the air or excluding
minorities from the production and planning levels of
programming.349 The FCC clarified that “the appearance of a black
person on a program does not necessarily mean that the program is
‘integrated’ in any meaningful sense or that integrated programming
is the sole test of discrimination.”350 Ultimately, AETC’s renewal
application was denied because there was no black representation on
the various boards and committees responsible for the production,
which the FCC held was a violation of its duty to serve the public
interest.351
When the FCC does not promote diversity, the court intervenes, as
in Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC.352
In United Church of Christ, WLBT’s renewal application for a
license to operate a television station was granted with conditions
despite WLBT’s proven racial and religious discrimination.353 In its
petition, the Commission claimed that WLBT had failed to properly
serve the community by failing to present a fair and balanced
presentation of controversial issues, especially those concerning
blacks, who compromised 45% of the total population within its
prime service area.354 Nevertheless, the FCC made the political
decision to allow WLBT to continue its operations based on its hope
that WLBT would improve and on the community’s need for a
properly run station.355 The Commission was willing to risk WLBT’s
continuation of improper conduct for efficiency purposes despite
WLBT’s failure to engage in the nondiscriminatory running of its

349.
350.
351.
352.
1966).
353.
354.
355.

Id. at 465–66, 468.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 470.
See generally Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 1000, 1007.
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television station.356 The Commission’s policy decision revealed that
ad hoc determinations exist in the government, and the results are
highly dependent on the value placed on the interests by those in
power.357 Fortunately, the D.C. Circuit overturned the Commission’s
conditional renewal of WLBT’s license and required a hearing.358
In United Church of Christ, the FCC failed to equally weigh the
interests of minorities receiving discriminatory programming or no
programming against the interests of others in the community.359 The
FCC seemed to not understand that the lack of diverse programming
could negatively impact community members as a whole, and its
actions would never have been reversed if members of the public did
not take an active interest and spend the time, money, and energy to
litigate the renewal of the license.360 The FCC’s actions showed two
problems: (1) discrimination at the station and programming level is
not being corrected despite the requirement that licenses be granted
in the public’s interest; and (2) these safeguards are being applied in
a biased manner because eliminating racial discrimination is still
viewed as less important than other efficiency or access reasons.361
Thus, a regulation that requires race-neutral casting calls is necessary
to ensure that diversity is promoted on television so the youth of
America can learn about other cultures from a less stereotypical or
discriminatory point of view.
Another example is in a dissent written by Justice Brennan where
he quoted a study that stated “[words] generally considered obscene
like ‘bullshit’ and ‘fuck’ are considered neither obscene nor
derogatory in the [black] vernacular except in particular contextual
situations and when used with certain intonations.”362 This
generalization of black culture to justify the country’s inability to
appreciate cultural pluralism is somewhat ironic because it imposes a
stereotypical view on a particular racial group that suggests bias and
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
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not actual cultural understanding. In fact, there are likely many black
people who find the words “bullshit” and “fuck” offensive. To
correct this stereotypical belief, it starts with how children perceive
certain races, which is socialized through television.
As the late President Kennedy stated, the civil rights legislation
was created:
to promote the general welfare by eliminating
discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national
origin in . . . public accommodations through the exercise
by Congress of the powers conferred upon it . . . to enforce
the provisions of the [F]ourteenth and [F]ifteenth
[A]mendments, to regulate commerce among the several
[s]tates, and to make laws necessary and proper to execute
the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.363
A regulation requiring race-neutral casting calls supports President
Kennedy’s ideas but also considers the argument for freedom of
speech and expression by creating the three exceptions where the
casting call can include race if character is essential: (1) to the
storyline, (2) to preserve historical or regional accuracy, or (3) to
maintain the network’s identity-themed programming. It is a
reasonable solution that will nudge Hollywood in the right direction.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Supreme Court stated, “Standards are the means
by which we state in advance how to test a law’s validity, rather than
letting the height of the bar be determined by the apparent exigencies
of the day.”364 Although the proposal might not be perfect as drafted,
we need to start somewhere. Laws are not created in a day or in one
law review article. It will take time for a final method of review to be
established. For example, it took sixteen years for the modern
363. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245 (1964).
364. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 785 (1996).
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obscenity standard to settle and forty years for the definition of a
public forum to solidify.365 However, we know for certain that
Congress, through statutes and regulations, has the power to respond
to “an unfortunate reality.”366 As Justice Ginsburg stated in her
dissent in Adarand, the unfortunate reality is:
[T]he unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this
country. The United States suffers from those lingering effects
because, for most of our Nation’s history, the idea that “we are just
one race[]” was not embraced. For generations, our lawmakers and
judges were unprepared to say that there is in this land no superior
race, no race inferior to any other. In Plessy v. Ferguson, not only did
this Court endorse the oppressive practice of race segregation, but
even Justice Harlan, the advocate of a “color-blind” Constitution,
stated: “The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in
wealth[,] and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all
time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty.”367
We see the effects of a system of racial caste that only recently
ended in our workplaces, markets, and neighborhoods. As Justice
Ginsburg explained in her Adarand dissent:
Job applicants with identical resumés, qualifications, and interview
styles still experience different receptions, depending on their race.
White and African-American consumers still encounter different
deals. People of color looking for housing still face discriminatory
treatment by landlords, real estate agents, and mortgage lenders.
Minority entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though they
are the low bidders, and they are sometimes refused work even after
winning contracts. Bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting
traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that

365. Id. at 777–78.
366. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 272 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
367. Id.
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must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever
genuinely to become this country’s law and practice.368
Thus, race-neutral casting calls are a small step in the right
direction because it attempts to address the root of the problem,
which is that the extremely influential film industry is priming the
youth of our country with discriminatory, stereotypical portrayals.
The regulation will hopefully increase diversity in Hollywood’s
leadership and lead to more on-screen appearances of minorities on
television and in the movies. But to achieve this, Congress must act
first.

368. Id. at 273–74.
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